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MODERNIZATION OR A MISSED OPPORTUNITY? THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY UPDATES THE
COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
The Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA” or the “Act”) was enacted in 1977 as a safeguard to ensure that insured depository institutions
meet the credit needs of their entire community, including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods.1 The Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (“FRB”), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(“FDIC”), and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”)
conduct periodic “performance evaluations” to determine whether these
institutions distribute loans fairly and evenly among customers of all economic backgrounds.2
Banks and lawmakers alike have recently questioned whether the
CRA adequately measures how banks extend credit and services to various demographic groups.3 Of the nation’s 5,644 depository institutions
subject to CRA examinations, 96% receive a passing rate, with only 16
of North Carolina’s 949 respective branches and offices receiving a subpar rating.4 While at first glance these numbers suggest financial inclusion by the overwhelming majority of banks, the current evaluation process does not adequately measure banks’ performance in light of CRA
objectives or technological and regulatory changes in the banking industry.5
1. Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”) § 30, 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (2012) (charging the
appropriate federal supervisory agencies to encourage financial institutions to “help meet the
credit needs of the local communities in which they are chartered consistent with the safe and
sound operation of such institutions.”).
2. FED. FIN. INST. COUNSEL, CMTY. REINVESTMENT ACT: BACKGROUND & PURPOSE
(Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.ffiec.gov/cra/history.htm.
3. See generally Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Releases Community Reinvestment Act Modernization Recommendations (Apr. 3, 2018) (describing the
Treasury’s call for modernization of CRA).
4. FED. FIN. INST. COUNSEL, FFIEC INTERAGENCY CRA RATING SEARCH (Nov. 1, 2018),
https://www.ffiec.gov/%5C/craratings/default.aspx; Memorandum from Treas. to the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 28 (Apr. 3, 2018).
5. See Scott Astrada, BankThink: Otting Should Strengthen, Not Weaken, CRA, AM.
BANKER, June 29, 2018, 2:33 PM, https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/otting-should-
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Comptroller of the Currency Joseph Otting has demonstrated his
willingness to update CRA procedures in light of the Trump Administration’s pledge to increase efficiency and effectiveness of financial regulation.6 On June 15, 2018, the OCC released a bulletin announcing modifications to supervisory policy and processes for CRA performance
evaluations, and on August 28, 2018, released an Advanced Notice for
Proposed Rulemaking (“ANPRM”) seeking public comment on various
improvements to the CRA.7 While the OCC was acting alone, its modifications and proposals were made after the U.S. Department of the
Treasury released a report in June, 2017, which “comprehensively assesse[d] how the CRA could be improved,”8 and a thirty-five-page memorandum on April 3, 2018, outlining weaknesses of the CRA and recommendations for its improvement.9 While these updates are intended to
provide more accurate and reliable indicators of a bank’s lending and investment activity across its community, the new protocol does not address the technological changes impacting banking operations.10
This Note addresses whether the OCC’s recent updates to the
CRA policy and procedures effectively meet concerns that the Act is antiquated. Part II explains the history of the CRA, and the process by
which banks are evaluated under the Act.11 Part III explains the various
critiques of the CRA in its current state.12 Part IV assesses the recent
changes to the CRA.13 Part V evaluates how the proposed changes to the
CRA inadequately meet the needs of borrowers and banks.14

strengthen-not-weaken-cra (discussing the history of lending discrimination that necessitates
strong lending regulations via the CRA).
6. See Exec. Order No. 13,772, 82 Fed. Reg. 9965 § 1(f) (Feb. 3, 2017) (outlining the
“Core Principles” of the Trump Administration’s financial policy).
7. Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Reforming the Community Reinvestment Act Regulatory Framework, 83 Fed. Reg.
45053 (proposed Aug. 28, 2018) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 25).
8. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC
OPPORTUNITIES, BANKS AND CREDIT UNIONS (2017).
9. Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, to the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System, and the Fed. Deposit
Ins. Corp. 9 (Apr. 3, 2018) [hereinafter Memorandum from Treasury].
10. See Modernizing the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), AM. BANKERS ASS’N,
https://www.aba.com/Advocacy/Issues/Pages/modernizing-cra.aspx (last visited Jan. 30,
2019) (claiming that the rules implementing CRA “have not kept pace with the times or with
new technologies”).
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Part V.
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II. CRA EXAMINATION PROCESS AND HISTORY
Congress passed the CRA to require the OCC, FRB and FDIC to
use their authority when examining financial institutions to encourage insured depository institutions to “help meet the credit needs of the local
communities in which they are chartered consistent with safe and sound
operation.”15 These three agencies have since implemented various regulations guiding the processes for evaluation, both individually in specific
provisions of the Code of Federal Regulations (“CFR”), and jointly via a
series of Inter-Agency Questions and Answers.16 Since Congress granted
these agencies discretion in determining how to evaluate banks’ community lending performance, it has repeatedly tightened the reins to require
greater disclosure and a more objective system.17
Examination results were initially not made available to the public, but Congress passed the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”) to amend the CRA and require
regulators to provide more detailed written evaluations, publicly disclose
CRA results, and establish a tiered rating system.18 Further, the RiegleNeal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 required
separate CRA performance assessments in each state where a bank maintains a physical presence.19 The following year, in 1995, the CRA examination process was modified to account for an institution’s size and business operations.20 Most recently, the agencies decided to adjust the asset
size thresholds for small and large institutions depending on the Consumer Price Index in 2005.21 But, while many have blamed CRA

15. Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”) § 30(b), 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (2012).
16. See generally TREASURY, FED. RESERVE SYS. AND FDIC, COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT

ACT: INTERAGENCY QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS REGARDING COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT, 81
Fed. Reg. 48506, 48506 (July 25, 2016) [hereinafter TREASURY INTERAGENCY
QUESTIONNAIRE] (implementing the most recent form of the Inter-Agency Questions and Answers).
17. DARYLL GETTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43661 AT 8, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE
COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT (2017).
18. 12 U.S.C. § 2906 (2012).
19. Id. § 2906(d) (removing restrictions on inter-state branching).
20. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE COMMUNITY
REINVESTMENT ACT (Feb. 13, 2008), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/braunstein20080213a.htm (stating that the CRA was modified in 1995 in response to
directive from President Clinton, ordering the respective agencies to make CRA regulations
more performance based, clarify performance standards, and make examination procedures
more consistent); Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 22156 (1995).
21. 12 C.F.R. § 228.12(u) (2012).
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requirements for contributing to the 2008 financial crisis, few improvements have been made in recent years to reflect the current state of banking.22
The OCC regulates national banks and federal savings associations, the FRB regulates state-chartered banks who are members of the
Federal Reserve System (“FRS”), and the FDIC regulates insured state
banks that are not members of the FRS.23 Insured depository institutions
are generally examined by their respective federal regulating agency
every three years, or less frequently in the case of smaller banks.24 The
results of these examinations are measured by CRA Performance Evaluations, made public through the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (“FFIEC”), and are assigned a rating of Outstanding, Satisfactory, Needs to Improve, or Substantial Noncompliance.25
While performance evaluations depend on the size and type of
bank evaluated, large banks with more than $1.252 billion in assets have
the most comprehensive test, consisting of the Lending Test, Investment
Test, and Service Test.26 All banks are subject to the Lending Test, which
evaluates the number and dollar amount of home mortgage, small business, small farm, and consumer loans among all income levels within the
bank’s assessment area.27 The Investment Test assesses the investment’s
dollar amount, complexity, and benefit to the assessment area, plus the
degree to which these investments are not routinely provided by private
investors.28 Finally, the Service Test examines the availability and effectiveness of retail banking services, and how community development services are provided within the assessment area.29 In addition, Intermediate
Small Banks, Wholesale Banks, and Limited Purpose Banks are subject
22. But see Neil Bhutta & Daniel Ringo, Assessing the Community Reinvestment Act’s
Role in the Financial Crisis, Federal Reserve Board (May 26, 2015), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/notes/feds-notes/2015/assessing-the-community-reinvestment-actsrole-in-the-financial-crisis-20150526.html (arguing that the incentive structure of the CRA
contributed little to the 2008 sub-prime mortgage crisis).
23. See OCC, CRA QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/compliance-bsa/cra/questions-and-answers.html (describing the regulatory landscape of CRA implementation).
24. See id. (stating that banks with $250 million or less aggregate assets and an “outstanding” rating are examined no sooner than 60 months after the most recent examination,
while banks of this size receiving a “satisfactory” rating are examined no sooner than 48
months after the most recent examination).
25. Memorandum from Treasury, supra note 9, at 28.
26. Memorandum from Treasury, supra note 9, at 29.
27. 12 C.F.R. § 25.22 (2012).
28. Id. § 25.23.
29. Id.
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to Community Development tests that evaluate the number and amount
of community development loans, qualified investments, and community
development services, plus the bank’s responsiveness to credit and community development needs within the assessment area.30
CRA ratings are ultimately determined by adding the points received on the Lending, Investment, and Services Tests.31 Regulators use
these ratings when considering a bank’s application to expand deposit
facilities by obtaining a national bank charter, opening new branches, relocating the home office or branch office, and merge or acquire other
banks.32 However, while banks that receive below a “satisfactory” rating
may be denied permission to expand their activities until improving their
rating, there is no way to actually penalize banks for poor lending performances in their community.33
III. CALLS FOR MODERNIZATION
A.

Changes in Technology and the Business of Banking

Despite organizational and technological changes that have affected the banking industry, the CRA has failed to evolve since its enactment over forty years ago.34 First, the practice of measuring CRA activity
within assessment areas bound by a bank’s physical geographic location
is unrepresentative of a banks’ overall activity—and thus outdated.35
Since the CRA’s birth, banking operations have expanded from traditional “brick and mortar” facilities—consisting of an institution’s main

30. See 12 C.F.R. § 25.24 (codifying procedure for the service test); see also Memorandum from Treasury supra note 9, at 29 (designating Intermediate Small Banks as banks with
between $313 million and $1.252 billion in assets).
31. See Memorandum from Treasury, supra note 9, at 30 (delegating the requisite point
value for each rating).
32. 12 U.S.C. § 2902(3) (2012).
33. Memorandum from Treasury, supra note 9, at 31.
34. See Joseph Otting, BankThink: We Have a Once-in-a-Generation Chance to Revamp
CRA. Let’s Use It., AM. BANKER, Aug. 30, 2018 (claiming changes to the regulatory framework “have failed to keep up with the evolution of how bank services are delivered, most
significantly as a result of interstate branching and the digitization of service”); but see RiegleNeal Act Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (“Riegle-Neal Act”), 12
U.S.C. § 2906(d) (2012) (delineating CRA evaluation standards for institutions with interstate
branches).
35. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY, CONSUMER AFFAIRS: DELINEATION OF
ASSESSMENT AREAS (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.kansascityfed.org/en/banking/fedconnections/archive/delineation-of-assessment-areas-8-1-17 (describing the process by which assessment areas are formed).
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office, its branches, and deposit-taking ATMs—to a digital empire of
online lending and mobile banking apps.36 Customers’ physical presence
is no longer required to deposit funds or take out loans.37 Rather, a customer may maintain an account with a bank in California, withdraw cash,
deposit checks, and take out loans with the touch of a screen—without
even leaving the customer’s home in New York.38 Today’s CRA examination process fails to account for the fact that banks no longer lend to
customers strictly within their physical communities.39 Instead, the evaluation should consider a bank’s lending activity overall, beyond geographic confines.40
Banks are currently required to present one or more assessment
areas for review, which include the institution’s main office, branches,
ATMs, and surrounding geographies in which the institution has originated or purchased a substantial portion of its loans.41 However, the assessment area may not extend substantially beyond a metropolitan statistical area or state boundary.42 Because banks’ lending activity is no
longer confined within a state or geographic region, this method of evaluation substantially limits banks’ comprehensive performance from CRA
consideration.43 In fact, examiners have increasingly begun to disregard

36. Id.
37. See, e.g., SANTANDER BANK, Bank Digitally and Confidentially, https://www.santan-

derbank.com/us/personal/banking/digital-banking/digital-banking-overview (last visited Feb.
9, 2019) (advertising the ability to “Check your balance, deposit checks, pay bills, shop with
Apple Pay, or transfer money virtually anywhere, any time”).
38. Id.
39. Kenneth Thomas, Why Fintechs Should be Held to CRA Standards, AM. BANKER,
Aug. 24, 2018.
40. Id.
41. Tina M. Brinson, Your Assessment Area and Performance Context, FIN. DEPOSIT INS.
CORP. at 3, (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.fdic.gov/news/conferences/other_events/2016-1027-banker-call.pdf (defining an assessment area as consisting of one or more MSAs (Metropolitan Statistical Areas), or one or more contiguous political subdivisions such as counties,
cities, or towns, including geographies where an institution has its deposit taking facilities,
and surrounding areas where a substantial portion of loans are made. The assessment area
may not extend substantially beyond an MSA or state boundary, and may not reflect illegal
discrimination or arbitrarily exclude low- and moderate-income areas).
42. Id.
43. See Lael Brainard, Keeping Community at the Heart of the Community Reinvestment
Act, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYSTEM (May 18, 2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20180518a.htm (discussing the need for CRA assessments to adapt to how technological advances have changed branching operations).

2019]

CRA MODERNIZATION

491

a bank’s assessment area, and are instead asserting that examiners should
define the area that banks serve during the evaluation process.44
If assessment areas based on counties, metropolitan statistical areas, or other measures of a bank’s physical location present challenges to
the precision of CRA evaluations, the concept of assessment areas may
be unworkable for contemporary banks with non-traditional business
models.45 “Specialized banks”—wholesale, limited purpose, or internet
banks—tend to have an even more limited presence in their designated
assessment areas.46 While many of these institutions are well-known
across the nation, they also tend to carry a smaller asset base and thus
lack the ability and physical presence to invest in community lending in
one specific area.47
The American Bankers Association (“ABA”) argues that banks,
rather than examiners, should define the assessment areas “based upon
the market they can reasonably serve.”48 Meanwhile, the Treasury advocates for a framework that includes areas where the bank is physically
located, as well as low- and moderate-income communities “outside of
where the bank has its physical footprint, and in areas where the bank
accepts deposits and does substantial business.”49 By using a broader
sample for assessment based upon the realistic expectations of where the
bank’s customers live, the CRA would allow banks to address the needs
among the entire customer-base, not just those who live within the assessment area.50
Second, as consumers are faced with more options for loans as a
result of improved banking technology, the CRA does not adequately account for alternative delivery systems.51 While the Interagency

44. AM. BANKERS ASS’N, CRA MODERNIZATION: MEETING COMMUNITY NEEDS AND
INCREASING TRANSPARENCY 5 (2017), https://www.aba.com/Advocacy/Documents/CRAWhitePaper2017.pdf [hereinafter ABA WHITE PAPER].
45. But see Brainard, supra note 43 (arguing that traditional branching operations are still
crucial in rural communities).
46. ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 44, at 7.
47. ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 44, at 7.
48. ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 44, at 5 (claiming that a “bank’s size, strategy, and
business model are relevant considerations as a bank determines the appropriate geography
of its CRA program”).
49. Memorandum from Treasury, supra note 9, at 6.
50. ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 44, at 7.
51. Michelle Lazette, As Branches Decline, How Do Bankers Continue to Comply with
CRA?, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.clevelandfed.org/newsroom-and-events/publications/forefront/ff-v7n04/ff-20161109-v7n0401-asbranches-decline-how-do-bankers-continue-to-comply-with-cra.aspx
(describing
the
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Questions and Answers Regarding Community Reinvestment directs examiners to consider alternative systems for delivering retail products and
services to the extent that they are effective in meeting the needs of lowand moderate-income individuals, banks receive inconsistent credit for
these services.52 Regulators evaluate this activity under the Service Test,
which determines the “innovativeness or complexity of qualified investments,” but the number of points these investments receive relative to
others “is up to the regulator’s judgment given that no formal definition
of ‘innovativeness’ or ‘complexity’ has been established.”53 This test,
which accounts for shifts in how banks provide financial services, “gets
a fraction of the space devoted to the Lending Test” and “appears to have
little impact on the provision of financial services to lower income individuals.”54
On July 31, 2018, the OCC announced it would begin to accept
national bank charter applications from fintech companies.55 These companies target millennials by boasting convenience and aim to lower the
cost of banking through their mobile-only platform.56 While the OCC
has demonstrated the agency’s willingness to consider non-traditional
banking models for regulation, rather than a fintech charter, some experts
fear that fintechs will not be held to the same community-lending standards as traditional banks due to their lack of physical offices.57 Varo
Money, for example—a Salt Lake City fintech company without physical
branches—has received preliminary and conditional approval from the
OCC to receive a national bank charter and will use the Salt Lake City
combined statistical area for CRA compliance—despite operating

difficulties bankers face in predicting “how examiners will weigh branches and alternative
delivery systems”).
52. TREASURY INTERAGENCY QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 16, at 48506.
53. GETTER, supra note 17, at 8.
54. William Apgar & Mark Duda, The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Community Reinvestment Act: Past Accomplishments and Future Regulatory Challenges, FRBNY
ECONOMIC POLICY REV., 169, 185 (June 2003), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/epr/03v09n2/0306apga.pdf.
55. Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Begins Accepting
National Bank Charter Applications for Financial Technology Companies (July 31, 2018),
https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2018/nr-occ-2018-74.html.
56. See generally Lisa Prevost, Mortgages for Millennials, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/02/realestate/mortgages-for-millennials.html (describing
the simplicity and prevalence of online mortgage applications).
57. See Hilary Burns, Fintech Out to Start National Bank Clears One Hurdle but Faces
More, AM. BANKER, Sept. 13, 2018 (noting that credit unions are currently exempt from CRA
regulation).
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exclusively electronically.58 It is clear that the regulators need to develop
some set of uniform standards for evaluating these companies in order to
avoid leniency by examiners and promote fair lending policies among
this emerging form of banking.
Low- and moderate-income individuals frequently use the cashchecking businesses of branch banks, but receive subprime loans from
less scrupulous digital sources which use automated systems to approve
lending services.59 Nonetheless, the Service Test component of the CRA,
which compares the hours of operation and equality of access to branches
to low versus higher-income individuals, does not adequately measure
the automated systems for approving loans.60 Consequently, lower-income individuals remain “underserved . . . to a greater degree than they
are with respect to mortgage lending.”61 Rather than focusing on how
banks’ alternative delivery systems are tailored to low- and moderateincome customers, critics claim the examination should consider whether
these customers utilize these delivery channels.62 This could, in turn, encourage the aforementioned consumers to borrow from more reliable financial institutions accompanied with less risk.63
B.

Clarify Subjective Procedures and Reduce Discretion of
Examiners

While the inter-agency approach of CRA examinations allows for
a more nuanced evaluation process and cumulative regulation, it is not
free of bureaucratic hurdles.64 The CRA is often criticized for its inconsistent methodologies and measures of evaluation which can limit the

58. See Memorandum from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, to Mitchell S.
Eitel, Re: Preliminary Conditional Approval of the De Novo Charter Application for the Proposed Varo Bank, National Association, at 2 (Aug. 31, 2018) (“[t]he bank does not plan to
have any branches or deposit taking ATMs. The only location around which the bank could
delineate an [assessment area] under the regulations is its proposed main office, which will
be located in Sale Lake City, Utah.”).
59. William Apgar, Jr. & Christopher Herbert, Subprime Lending and Alternative Financial Service Providers: A Literature Review and Empirical Analysis, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS.
AND URBAN DEV., at vii, https://www.huduser.gov/Publications/pdf/sublending.pdf.
60. 12 U.S.C. § 25.23 (2012).
61. Apgar & Duda, supra note 54, at 185.
62. ABA WHITE PAPER supra note 44, at 6.
63. ABA WHITE PAPER supra note 44, at 6.
64. See Hannah Lang, Fed’s Powell ‘Hopeful’ that Agencies will Come Together on CRA
Reform, AM. BANKER, Sept. 26, 2018 (describing the challenges of coordinating CRA reform
across multiple agencies).
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ability to compare the performance of different banks.65 CRA examinations consist of a two-part test composed of a Small Bank Lending Evaluation, and Community Development Test, which measures a bank’s
loans, investments, and services separately.66 The Lending, Investments,
and Services Tests are applied inconsistently by the different banking
agencies.67
The Lending Test is also applied inconsistently, as the OCC
measures market share while other agencies measure portfolio shares.68
These are both adequate indicators of performance individually, but are
incompatible when compared against each other.69 Similarly, the
measures used in the Investment Test—which evaluates CRA-related investments relative to a bank’s capacity—depend on which agency performs the evaluation.70 While most agencies compare a bank’s investments to its assets, the OCC uses a ratio of investments to tier-one capital,
complicating the way banks of similar sizes can be compared.71 Finally,
in conducting the Service Test, the agencies differ in how much they consider branches not within the low- and moderate-income tracts “that are
in close proximity to [low- and moderate-income] tracts, and disagree
about “what close proximity means.”72
Some evaluation standards even differ within the same agency
that conducts the performance evaluation.73 For example, in its 2013 examination of Capital One74 and 2007 examination of JP Morgan Chase,75
65. See ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 44, at 1 (arguing that the CRA examination process needs more predictability and transparency); Getter, supra note 17, at 8; National Community Reinvestment Coalition, Letter to the Treasury: Strengthening the Community Reinvestment Act, NCRC (Feb. 5, 2018), https://ncrc.org/letter-to-treasury/ [hereinafter NCRC
Letter to Treasury].
66. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT
(CRA), at 11, https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/director/presentations/cra.pdf.
67. NCRC Letter to Treasury, supra note 65.
68. See NCRC Letter to Treasury, supra note 65 (stating that the market share compares
the percent of total low- and moderate-income market captured by the bank with the percent
of overall market captured by the bank).
69. NCRC Letter to Treasury, supra note 65.
70. NCRC Letter to Treasury, supra note 65.
71. NCRC Letter to Treasury, supra note 65.
72. NCRC Letter to Treasury, supra note 65.
73. Getter, supra note 17, at 8.
74. Public Disclosure: Comptroller of the Currency, Community Reinvestment Act Performance Evaluation, Capital One, National Association (Dec. 31, 2013),
https://www.occ.gov/static/cra/craeval/oct16/13688.pdf.
75. Public Disclosure: Comptroller of the Currency, Community Reinvestment Act Performance Evaluation, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (January 1, 2007),
https://www.occ.gov/static/cra/craeval/Aug08/8.pdf.
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the OCC counted branches in outside the low- and moderate-income
tracts “as if they are within one half mile of an LMI tract” in its examination of JP Morgan Chase, but the OCC used a measurement of one mile
in its examination of Capital One.76 It is clear, therefore, that the Interagency Questions and Answers Regarding Community Reinvestment
should be revised to include more specific procedures for which measurements should be used during the performance evaluation.77
Ultimately, the lack of clear guidelines for examination criteria
gives individual examiners too much discretion during performance evaluations.78 The Treasury admitted in a memorandum published on April
3, 2018, that the CRA has “too many subjective elements,” which “creates significant compliance burdens and related costs, without any commensurate gain in quality or execution of banks’ CRA activity in the communities that banks are aiming to serve.”79 In particular, individual
examiners have the ability to determine either or a narrow or broad scope
of the examination, choose the number of points each bank receives for
its respective CRA eligible activities, and interpret the percentage of
bank’s lending activity that falls within its assessment areas—or In/Out
Ratio.80 In addition, there is no specific number of points required for a
bank to earn each level of examiner rating.81 Current procedures “allow
examiners to subjectively interpret and apply CRA examination policies
and procedures.”82 Consequently, the Treasury—and interested parties
across the ideological spectrum—advocate for a more clear-cut examination approach that would allow the results of similarly positioned banks
to be more easily measured and compared.83
C.

Other Criticisms of the CRA

While critics have called for more clear and definite guidelines,
the CRA also lacks inclusivity of certain characteristics that cannot be

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

NCRC Letter to Treasury supra note 65.
TREASURY INTERAGENCY QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 16 at 48506.
NCRC Letter to Treasury, supra note 65.
Memorandum from Treasury, supra note 9, at 9.
See Memorandum from Treasury, supra note 9, at 3 (describing that examiner ratings
are ultimately determined solely based on qualitative factors).
81. Memorandum from Treasury, supra note 9, at 10.
82. Memorandum from Treasury, supra note 9, at 12.
83. Memorandum from Treasury, supra note 9, at 12.
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measured by rigid standards.84 Many have suggested enhanced training
of examiners as a solution that would allow those conducting the evaluations to have a better understanding of why these tests are being conducted, and which factors matter the most.85 In addition, the ambiguity
of these guidelines and the debate about how certain activities should be
included in CRA evaluations demonstrate the need for greater communication between regulators and banks.86
Critics have disputed whether the evaluation process should allow banks to receive CRA credit for more types of loans, investments,
and services than those previously recognized.87 The ABA argues that
community development initiatives that would benefit a bank’s entire
community do not receive community development credits because current regulatory practices only recognize initiatives targeted to low- or
moderate-income individuals, or which will “revitalize or stabilize disaster areas or underserved or distressed middle-income areas.”88 Meanwhile, the National Community Reinvestment Coalition (“NCRC”) retorts that providing credit for financial education that broadly serves an
entire community could allow banks to reduce their efforts targeting the
low- and moderate-income communities specifically.89
In addition, the NCRC and ABA disagree about whether small
business lending should be considered for community development
credit.90 The ABA claims that small business loans and loans to nonprofits with a community development purpose should be classified as
community development loans in order to adequately measure the impact
banks are having in their communities.91 Meanwhile, the NCRC claims
that “doing so would double count small business loans and inflate the
Lending Test rate.”92 Nonetheless, this dispute demonstrates the lack of
transparency in the CRA evaluation process.93 Because the CRA “looks
84. ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 44, at 12; NCRC Letter to Treasury, supra note 65.
85. ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 44, at 12.
86. ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 44, at 12 (claiming that “banks receive little to no

communication from regulators until they are presented with the exam report months (and in
some cases over a year) later.”).
87. ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 44, at 12.
88. See ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 44, at 12 (listing financial literacy instruction and
financing the construction of infrastructure and community service establishments such as
hospitals as the initiatives that benefit a bank’s entire community but do not receive credit).
89. NCRC Letter to Treasury, supra note 65.
90. NCRC Letter to Treasury, supra note 65; ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 44, at 2.
91. ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 44, at 4.
92. NCRC Letter to Treasury, supra note 65.
93. NCRC Letter to Treasury, supra note 65.
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backward,” providing feedback potentially years after the evaluation process on whether investments are sufficient for CRA purposes, there is an
established need for increased communication with CRA regulators, and
a clear framework on which investments should receive credit.94
IV. OCC MODERNIZATION EFFORTS
Recognizing the imperfections of the CRA in its current form,
affiliated agencies have begun clearing the way to modernize the evaluation process.95 Despite the Treasury memorandum suggesting improvements to the CRA, the OCC has largely acted alone to revamp the CRA.96
It requested public comment in its ANPRM, and released a bulletin to
“inform national banks, federal savings associations, and federal
branches and agencies (collectively banks) about clarifications to OCC
supervisory policies and processes regarding how examiners evaluate and
communicate bank performance under the CRA.”97 These proposals and
modifications involve geographic constraints on assessment areas, the
type of information considered in a performance evaluation, and changes
to the timeline of the evaluation process.98
A.

Geographic Factors

One of the main sources of contention for the CRA is that, as
banks evolve to use technology for desired services, the current protocol
fails to account for the increasing spread of customers outside the geographic boundaries imposed by the assessment areas.99 The OCC bulletin
states that, “in evaluating the borrower distribution of loans outside a
bank’s [assessment areas, the OCC] evaluates lending state by state and
compares the level of bank lending to statewide demographic

94. Memorandum from Treasury, supra note 9, at 9.
95. Memorandum from Treasury, supra note 9, at 10.
96. Reforming the Community Reinvestment Act Regulatory Framework, 83 Fed. Reg.

45053, 45053 (proposed Aug. 28, 2018) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 25, 195).
97. OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, SUPERVISORY POLICY AND PROCESSES
FOR COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS: OCC Bulletin 2018–17
(2018),
https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2018/bulletin-2018-17.html
[hereinafter OCC Bulletin].
98. Id.
99. Josh Silver, NCRC Analysis of OCC Bulletin 2018-17, NAT’L COMMUNITY
REINVESTMENT COALITION (June 20, 2018), https://ncrc.org/ncrc-analysis-of-occ-bulletin2018-17.
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comparators.”100 While lending to small businesses and farms will not
compensate for a poor lending performance within the assessment area,
examiners may consider the distribution of these loans outside the assessment area.101 This certainly demonstrates a trend toward expanding the
evaluation of a bank’s lending beyond the designated assessment area to
include areas outside the branch with high lending volumes.102
This expansive approach to examining retail lending outside the
bank’s assessment areas could resolve some of the issues that have
emerged while assessing online banking and mobile lending platforms.103
By considering a bank’s performance outside of its assessment areas, this
system incentivizes banks to continue lending to low- and moderate-income customers who do not live near a physical branch.104 This could,
for example, benefit customers in rural areas who have few options in
terms of physical storefronts.105 Rural banks will now face competitive
pressure from their online counterparts who offer lower rates to a broader
clientele.106
The ANPRM additionally provides some avenue of guidance to
regulate exclusively-online lenders.107 As fintechs like Varo begin to receive national bank charters, the provision comparing the level a bank
lends within particular states to its demographic comparators may be easily applied to banks with no physical branches.108 Nonetheless, the OCC
avoids burdening banks and their examiners by requiring them to analyze
each and every state where the bank exists or purchases loans, but instead
focuses on states “where the level of banking is sufficient to conduct a
meaningful analysis of borrower distribution.”109

100. OCC Bulletin supra note 97.
101. See Silver, supra note 99 (claiming that this implies that a bank’s lending outside the

assessment area may elevate a satisfactory rating, but will not improve a failed lending test).
102. Silver, supra note 99.
103. See NCRC Letter to Treasury, supra note 65 (“[There should be an] expansion to
include areas with significant amounts of retail lending outside of branch networks will also
facilitate community development lending and investing in additional geographic areas.”).
104. NCRC Letter to Treasury, supra note 65.
105. Silver, supra note 99.
106. Silver, supra note 99.
107. Burns, supra note 57.
108. Burns, supra note 57.
109. OCC Bulletin, supra note 97.
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Type of Information Considered in the Performance Evaluation

Another source of criticism lies in the highly subjective guidelines for examiners to conduct performance evaluations.110 First, it is often still unclear whether an activity is considered to promote economic
development under the existing CRA standards.111 In order to support
community development, activities that promote economic development
by financing small businesses and farms must meet both a “size” and a
“purpose” test.112 The recent OCC bulletin describes the size test as
measuring “size eligibility requirements” while the purpose test ensures
that activities have a community development goal.113 This bulletin clarifies some of the inconsistencies associated with the definition of community development, listing “loans, investments, and services that help
to create, retain, and/or improve jobs for [low- and moderate-income] individuals, in [low- and moderate-income] geographies, or in areas targeted for redevelopment” by any level of government as meeting the purpose test.114 The notice further specifies that loans, investments, and
services that help to retain jobs only count for CRA purposes when the
loans demonstrate a community development purpose specifically enumerated by the agencies. 115
This update removes some of the existing vagueness behind the
community development qualifications, but does not resolve the debate
over whether small business lending should qualify as community development.116 While the updates to CRA policy provide additional guidance
to examiners, and eliminate subjectivity with regards to the “size” and
“purpose” tests required for economic development to be considered to
support community development, the OCC essentially sidestepped the
real issue at hand—leaving banks uncertain about which activities comply with regulation, and ultimately necessitating further clarification.117
In addition, the OCC seeks to increase the scrutiny non-metropolitan assessment areas receive by modifying the standards for scope of
110. Silver, supra note 99.
111. OCC Bulletin, supra note 97.
112. FED. DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP., “CRA – Understanding Community Development”

Presentation at the FDIC New York Region Regulatory Teleconference (Feb. 6, 2004),
https://www.fdic.gov/news/conferences/ny/2015-08-13.pdf.
113. OCC Bulletin, supra note 97.
114. OCC Bulletin, supra note 97.
115. OCC Bulletin, supra note 97.
116. OCC Bulletin, supra note 97.
117. OCC Bulletin, supra note 97.
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examinations and effectively expand the amount of data considered overall.118 Currently, the Treasury reports that CRA examiners have the discretion to designate assessment areas as either full scope or limited
scope.119 While full scope examinations consider both qualitative and
quantitative factors, CRA examinations of limited scope assessment areas
consider only quantitative factors, and include short narratives reporting
whether the performance was consistent or inconsistent with the bank’s
overall performance—measured by full-scope reviews.120
The majority of assessment areas subject to full-scope reviews
are metropolitan statistical areas, whereas the majority of banks’ nonmetropolitan assessment areas receive limited-scope evaluations and generally report few community development activities in their performance
evaluations.121 Because banks in non-metropolitan areas face less competition, low- and moderate-income customers in these regions have
fewer options for borrowing—making the CRA even more important in
these areas.122 It therefore seems counterintuitive that these assessment
areas would receive less scrutiny.123
Because full-scope evaluations are more time-intensive and burdensome, examiners might have an incentive to examine banks under a
limited scope when possible.124 The OCC’s 2018 bulletin seeks to reduce
the discretion given to examiners in deciding whether to evaluate under
a full or limited scope.125 First, the bulletin requires at least one assessment area to be evaluated with full scope procedures when a bank has
multiple assessment areas within a single state.126 This sets a baseline
requiring a detailed examination of each state assessed.127 In addition,
narrative comments and conclusions for non-metropolitan statistical areas within a state will be presented in a combined narrative in the
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

OCC Bulletin, supra note 97.
Memorandum from Treasury, supra note 9, at 18.
Memorandum from Treasury, supra note 9.
Memorandum from Treasury, supra note 9.
See NCRC Letter to Treasury, supra note 65 (“More full scope designation to rural
areas, in particular, will result in banks making more retail loans, community development
loans, and qualified investments in rural areas”).
123. See NCRC Letter to Treasury, supra note 65 (“Applying more full scope designation
to rural areas, in particular, will result in banks making more retail loans, community developemt loans, and qualified investments in rural areas.”).
124. See OCC Bulletin, supra note 97 (describing the processes for conducting full- and
limited-scope evaluations).
125. OCC Bulletin, supra note 97.
126. OCC Bulletin, supra note 97.
127. OCC Bulletin, supra note 97.
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performance evaluation—as will metropolitan divisions within the same
metropolitan statistical areas—and reviewed as a whole using either fullor limited-scope procedures as applicable.128 Consequently, more assessment areas—both metropolitan and non-metropolitan—will be reviewed
in greater detail more frequently.129
Moreover, the June 2018 OCC bulletin provides guidance to examiners for determining the scope for evaluating the assessment area.130
This “comprehensive approach” considers such factors as the lending, investment, and service needs in the assessment area, the number of banks
in each assessment area (especially when few financial service providers
operate in the assessment area), the importance of the examined bank to
serving each assessment area, the length of time since the assessment area
has been reviewed under full scope procedures, and public comments
about the bank’s performance in the assessment area.131 Finally, the bulletin requires a bank’s performance in both full and limited scope assessment areas to be considered for the area conclusion—increasing the importance of limited scope evaluations.132 These changes will encourage
examiners to scrutinize banks’ activity in small metropolitan and rural
communities, rather than focusing merely on communities with more options when it comes to lending.133
By setting clear standards for which assessment areas should receive full scope evaluation, and increasing the possibility that each assessment area will be subject to a full scope evaluation at some point in
time, these changes will efficiently expand the amount of data reviewed
under the CRA.134 The rotating system will ensure that areas will be subject to greater scrutiny over time, but examiners will still be spared the
intensity of requiring every assessment area to be evaluated under a full
scope.135 The increase in data for consideration will allow examinations
to be more flexible, whereas the guidance on which areas should receive
heightened scrutiny will eliminate inconsistencies across examiners.136
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

OCC Bulletin, supra note 97.
OCC Bulletin, supra note 97.
OCC Bulletin, supra note 97.
OCC Bulletin, supra note 97.
OCC Bulletin, supra note 97.
See NCRC Letter to Treasury, supra note 65 (discussing the importance of conducting more full-scope examinations on rural communities).
134. NCRC Letter to Treasury, supra note 65.
135. NCRC Letter to Treasury, supra note 65.
136. See Treasury Issues Recommendations for CRA Modernization, ABA BANKING J.
(Apr. 3, 2018), https://bankingjournal.aba.com/2018/04/treasury-issues-recommendations-
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While the OCC still has room to clarify the definition of community development, the bulletin demonstrates a trend toward striking balance between objectivity and flexibility.137
C.

Changes to the Evaluation Process

Proposed changes to the timing of performance evaluations and
the application of investigation results involving potential discriminatory
or other illegal credit practices have received the bulk of attention coming
from critics of the OCC’s June 2018 bulletin.138 Just nine days after the
bulletin’s release, the nine members of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs voiced their concerns with these provisions, asking that the Comptroller of the Currency question these implementations, and requesting that he rescind the bulletin.139 These
provisions are also the subject of criticism from the NCRC.140
First, the bulletin extended the CRA examination cycle for some
141
banks. The examination cycle for banks with more than $250 million
in assets and thirty or more rating areas on the previous CRA evaluation
will be extended from thirty-six months to forty-eight; meanwhile, banks
with less than thirty rating areas on the previous CRA evaluation remain
subject to a thirty-six-month cycle.142 NCRC claims that a four-year cycle can allow banks to demonstrate lax CRA efforts during the first two
years of an exam cycle while increasing their efforts the last two years.143
The Senate Committee on Banking corroborates these claims, arguing that while performance evaluations “often take too long and can
leave banks with dated ratings and the public with inadequate information
about a bank’s current performance,” a more sensible policy change
would have “maintained or shortened the 36-month exam cycle rather

for-cra-modernization/ (“[T]he changes to the CRA serve as ‘[a]djustments that enhance the
transparency, consistency, and predictability of the supervisory process . . . ,’ said American
Bankers Association President and CEO Rob Nichols.”).
137. OCC Bulletin, supra note 97.
138. OCC Bulletin, supra note 97.
139. Letter from U.S. Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs to Joseph M.
Otting 2 (July 24, 2018), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2018/08/CRA-letter.pdf [hereinafter Senate Letter to Otting].
140. Silver, supra note 99.
141. OCC Bulletin, supra note 97.
142. OCC Bulletin, supra note 97.
143. Silver, supra note 99.
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than lengthening it to 48 months.”144 Modernization efforts should seek
to streamline the evaluation process, enhance predictability, promote
consistency, and ultimately encourage investing in low- and moderateincome communities.145 By extending the time between evaluations, the
OCC is instead allowing banks to act more unpredictably and inconsistently, compensating for poor performance toward the end of their evaluation cycles.146
Second, the proposed rules will allow performance evaluations
to be published if investigations involving potentially discriminatory or
otherwise illegal credit practices are not resolved within ninety days after
a performance evaluation is considered final for issuance to the bank, rather than holding the exams open until the conclusion of these investigations, as was previously done.147 Any findings of discriminatory or illegal credit practices after the issuance of a performance evaluation will be
considered in the following CRA evaluation and penalized retroactively.148 This change has been criticized by progressive interest groups
and democratic politicians for allowing examiners to give banks more
leeway, considering a bank’s corrective measures over their illegal practices in the subsequent CRA rating.149 Coupled with the extension in
evaluation cycles, this provision is especially dangerous because examiners have even more time to discount a bank’s discrimination since its
discovery.150
Much of the CRA’s influence on community lending practices
comes from the deterrent threat imposed by ramifications for non-compliance, as banks receiving less than a satisfactory rating on CRA examinations may be blocked from branching, merging, or converting charters.151 However, this provision would allow banks to make these critical
business moves even after findings of deficiencies.152 In order to most
effectively deter banks from engaging in illegal and discriminatory credit
practices, and to prevent examiners from having too much influence on
144. See NCRC Letter to Treasury, supra note 65.
145. Senate Letter to Otting, supra note 139, at 1.
146. See Senate Letter to Otting, supra note 139, at 1 (criticizing the proposed changes to

the evaluation timeline); Silver, supra note 99.
147. Senate Letter to Otting, supra note 139, at 1.
148. OCC Bulletin, supra note 97.
149. Silver, supra note 99; Senate Letter to Otting, supra note 139, at 1.
150. OCC Bulletin, supra note 97.
151. See Getter, supra note 17, at 15 (describing the incentives for receiving a positive
CRA rating—and punishments for less-than-”satisfactory” ratings).
152. Silver, supra note 99.
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the results of performance evaluations, the CRA ratings should be downgraded as closely as possible to the illegal behavior so these ramifications
are felt strongly in conjunction with the violation.153
V. CONCLUSION
While the OCC’s updates to the antiquated CRA provide workable standards that reduce discretion given to individual examiners, they
fail to fully improve the predictability of the rating process and enhance
banks’ certainty of their performance before the examination.154 While
the last two components of the June bulletin—extending the evaluation
period for large banks to forty-eight months, and applying results of investigations retroactively—are perhaps meant to ease the burden placed
on banks during the examination process, the ends may be reached by
much less contentious means.155
CRA regulators have long faced pressure to increase the communication between banks and agencies before the evaluation process so that
banks know whether they are complying before receiving their results.156
While the bulletin mentions increasing the communication between examiners and OCC supervised banks during the performance evaluations,
it does not address communication with banks before these evaluations
begin.157 Furthermore, the bulletin makes no mention of coordinating the
measures of assessment and comparison across agencies—or even individual examiners—during the evaluation processes mentioned above.158
It seems counterintuitive that the OCC would make efforts to modernize
the CRA on its own, given that a great source of criticism lies in the unpredictability of the CRA’s multi-agency structure.159 With more certainty of the status of their compliance, banks would be able to maximize

153. OCC Bulletin, supra note 97; Silver, supra note 99.
154. But see Memorandum from Treasury, supra note 9, at 2 (describing the goals of CRA

modernization as including “examination clarity and flexibility.”).
155. Silver, supra note 99.
156. See ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 44, at 13 (recommending in 2017 that “banking
agencies provide more transparency regarding how CRA ratings are assigned.”).
157. OCC Bulletin, supra note 97.
158. OCC Bulletin, supra note 97.
159. See Evan Weinberger, Bank Branches to Stay in Community Lending ReWrite, Agencies Say, BLOOMBERG BNA (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/XANL07R8000000?bna_news_filter=securitieslaw&jcsearch=BNA%25200000016635d6d20fa3ef7ffe969d0001#jcite (“But neither [FDIC
nor FRB] joined the OCC’s August outline.”).
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their service to the community while promoting cooperation and efficiency for these regulatory bodies during the examination process.160
The OCC does provide parameters that eliminate subjectivity for
some of the evaluation’s qualitative measures.161 The requirements for
which assessment areas should receive full versus limited scope evaluations help to ensure CRA compliance by banks in less heavily populated
areas.162 Plus, the description of activities that promote economic development lists some factors for meeting the purpose test in order to shed
light on which activities count toward “community development.”163
However, the bulletin fails to eliminate the most glaring uncertainty surrounding the definition of community development by staying silent as
to whether small business lending counts as community development.164
This move leaves the area subject to more debate in the future—and open
to the discretion of the examiner.165
Despite these shortcomings, the OCC’s modernization efforts do
fall in line with objectives for adapting to changes in technology and the
business of banking.166 The bulletin has enumerated protocols for assessing how banks are lending outside their assessment area by comparing the distribution lent outside assessment areas state-by-state to
statewide demographic competitors.167 This provides guidance for
fintech companies with few (if any) physical branches, and banks with
customers operating via mobile applications outside the assessment
area.168 Lending to those who do not live near a physical branch can
bridge the divide between urban and rural users—with the latter often
facing more difficulty obtaining loans.169
The OCC’s efforts to modernize the CRA certainly improve specific areas of the evaluation process, but as a whole, the larger issues with
the inter-agency construction remain unsolved.170 As these proposals

160. ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 44, at 13.
161. Silver, supra note 99.
162. See OCC Bulletin, supra note 97 (listing activities considered to promote economic

development for the purpose test).
163. OCC Bulletin, supra note 97.
164. Silver, supra note 99.
165. Silver, supra note 99.
166. Memorandum from Treasury, supra note 9, at 6.
167. OCC Bulletin, supra note 97.
168. ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 44 at 13.
169. NCRC Letter to Treasury, supra note 65.
170. Kriston Capps, It’s Time to ReWrite Fair Lending Rules. (Just Not Like This.),
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make their way through the OCC, the FDIC, FRB and OCC may miss a
crucial opportunity to improve the regulatory process that controls the
fate of community lending across demographics.171
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